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Th is paper addresses c r i t i c i sms o f t ransac t ion -cos t theory 
t ha t it overs ta tes t h e effect of asset spec ia l iza t ion on ver-
t ica l i n teg ra t i on and unders ta tes t he cos ts of manag ing 
i n te run i t r e l a t i onsh ips w i t h i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n , part icularly 
f o r n o n s t a n d a r d o rgan i za t i ons and marke ts . W e apply the 
t h e o r y s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t o decent ra l i zed s u p p l y re lat ion-
sh ips in a m a n u f a c t u r i n g c o r p o r a t i o n a n d to t he corpora-
t i o n ' s re la t i onsh ips w i t h s ing le -source supp l i e rs . Our 
resul ts s u p p o r t t h e core p ropos i t i on o f t he t h e o r y — t h a t 
specia l ized assets have l ower t r ansac t i on costs w i t h i n the 
o rgan iza t i on . H o w e v e r , the hyb r i d charac ter is t ics o f these 
supp l y re la t ionsh ips cha l lenge bo th t h e t h e o r y ' s basic as-
s u m p t i o n s and its p red ic t i ve p o w e r . Co rpo ra te decentral i -
zat ion and re la t iona l con t rac t i ng in t h e marke t d im in i sh 
t h e ro le of asset spec i f ic i ty as a necessary cond i t i on for 
l o w t ransac t ion costs in -house and as a su f f i c ien t condi-
t i o n f o r h igh t ransac t ion costs in t he marke t . There fo re , 
h o w t he t h e o r y s h o u l d be used as a p red i c to r o f shi f ts in 
t he cu r ren t b o u n d a r i e s o f the c o r p o r a t i o n is unclear.* 
B A C K G R O U N D 
Do organizations and markets govern transact ions differently? 
This quest ion has mot ivated a large body of research that has 
reached divergent conclusions. Proponents of transaction-
cost theory (Wil l iamson, 1985) have found that organizations 
and markets differ in their governance capabil it ies. Other au-
thors (St inchcombe, 1983; Granovetter, 1985; Eccles and 
Whi te , 1988), however, suggest that the transaction-cost ar-
gumen t is stated too strongly. They argue that organizations 
and markets are not discrete insti tut ions to wh ich the theory 
can be straightforwardly applied. 
A central hypothesis of transaction-cost theory is that inter-
unit relationships in wh ich supplier assets are specialized 
have lower transaction costs inside an organization than w h e n 
the relationship occurs between organizations (Klein, Craw-
ford, and Alchian, 1978; Riordan and Wi l l iamson, 1985; D e m -
setz, 1988). Asset specialization increases the buyer 's loss if 
the supply relationship is terminated. The potential for a 
higher loss provides the supplier w i th an opportuni ty to bar-
gain for a greater share of the value of the relat ionship. Thus, 
as the supplier 's assets become specialized, it should be 
more reluctant to bear the costs of adapting to changes in t h e 
buyer 's needs. Such a difficulty in bargaining be tween units is 
managed more effectively, according to transact ion-cost 
theory, by organizational authority than by contract ing in the 
market. Organizational authority is more ef fect ive because 
the organization controls resource allocation to the units and 
has better information about their costs (Wi l l iamson, 1975: 
154). 
A substantial amount of research (Monteverde and Teece, 
1982; Anderson and Schmitt lein, 1984; Mas ten , 1984; 
Walker and Weber, 1984) has produced results that are con -
sistent w i th this logic. The standard test of the theory, w h e n 
examining how transactions are governed, is to predict 
whe the r an activity is performed inside or outside an organi-
zation by the extent to which the activit ies' assets are spe-
cialized. These tests have shown for several types of 
funct ions (e.g., sales force, manufacturing componen t fabr i -
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cat ion, research and development) that assets in the f i rm 
tend to be more special ized than the assets of independent 
suppl iers. 
There are t w o potent ial ly t roubl ing characterist ics of these 
s tud ies . First, they have not compared transaction costs in-
s ide the organizat ion to t ransact ion costs be tween the orga-
nization and its outs ide suppl iers under comparable degrees 
of asset special izat ion. This compar ison is required to demon-
strate that an organization has superior governance capabili-
t ies relat ive to t he market. Second, the causes of asset 
speci f ic i ty in interuni t relat ionships have not been specif ied. 
This omiss ion is signif icant, since assets inside an organiza-
t ion may b e c o m e specialized after they are vertically inte-
gra ted. The in ference that an organization lowers transaction 
cos ts by vert ical ly integrating operat ions w i t h high asset 
speci f ic i ty may therefore be incorrect. These omissions make 
it d i f f icul t t o respond to crit ics w h o have argued that the 
theory overs ta tes the ef fect of supplier asset specif ici ty on 
vert ical in tegrat ion (Dore, 1983; Coase, 1988; Demsetz, 
1988) and understa tes the bureaucrat ic and interunit bar-
gaining costs that vertical integrat ion entails (Perrow, 1986; 
Eccles and Wh i t e , 1988). 
These cr i t ic isms are particularly relevant to research on orga-
nizations and markets that do not con fo rm to ideal types. In 
many organizat ions, in-house units may be governed like 
marke t suppl iers. Mult idivisional corporat ions decentral ize 
contro l over interdivisional supply relat ionships. Decentraliza-
t ion induces a market- l ike incent ive sys tem favoring coordina-
t ion w i th in t he divisions, organized as profi t centers, at the 
expense of coordinat ion b e t w e e n t h e m (Chandler, 1962; Gal-
brai th, 1973; Wi l l iamson, 1975). Evans and Grossman (1983) 
argued that such a market- l ike incentive sys tem is both more 
cost ly and less ef fect ive than the market itself. Wi l l iamson 
(1985: 140) also expressed reservations about the ef fect ive-
ness of " h i gh powered incent ives" w i th in a corporat ion. Fi-
nally, Eccles and Wh i te (1988) descr ibed cases in wh ich profit 
centers in mult idivisional corporat ions prefer relationships 
w i t h independent suppliers to in-house relationships because 
the latter are more diff icult to manage. 
Conversely , marke t suppliers may be governed like organiza-
t ional units (St inchcombe, 1983; Bradach and Eccles, 1989). 
The ex is tence of "quas i - f i rms" (Eccles, 1981) and long-term 
contracts (Joskow, 1985) as subst i tu tes for vertical integra-
t ion (Kleindorfer and Knieps, 1982) have long been observed. 
MacNe i l (1978), fu r thermore , descr ibed markets in wh ich the 
suppl ier 's expecta t ion of an enduring business generates ef-
fec t i ve no rms of confl ict resolut ion. MacNei l called this type 
of supply relat ionship "relat ional cont rac t ing . " A critical test of 
the theory w o u l d compare the ef fect of asset specialization 
on t ransact ion cos ts w i th in decentral ized corporat ions to its 
e f fec t in hybr id market supply relationships, like relational 
cont rac t ing . This is precisely our purpose in this paper. 
HYPOTHESES 
A s s e t spec i f i c i t y . Decentral ized mult idivisional f i rms are 
c o m p o s e d of prof i t centers that may supply each other w i t h 
goods and services. Corporate management must we igh the 
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1 
The theory here concerns contracting 
problems faced by the buyer after the 
supplier has invested in new technology 
to get the buyer's business We do not 
examine the motivations that led the sup-
plier to make the investment. Presumably, 
one of these would be the large size of 
the order the supplier would receive from 
the buyer 
effect on corporate performance of poor interdivisional adap-
tation to ongoing changes in a supply relat ionship against the 
effect of higher profitability in the supp ly ing divis ion. In-
creasing asset specif icity in the supply ing prof i t center may 
raise the costs of poor interdivisional adaptat ion beyond divi-
sional gains. Therefore, w h e n divis ions w i t h specialized 
assets do not facilitate adaptation w i t h the i r internal cus-
tomers, corporate management may in te rvene to reduce the 
potential loss or signal that intervent ion w i l l occur if coordina-
tion does not improve (Eccles and W h i t e , 1988). This threat 
of intervention reinforces the e f fec t iveness of other coordina-
tion mechanisms developed to resolve in terun i t confl ict in-
volving specialized assets (Thompson, 1967 : chap. 5; 
Galbraith, 1973). 
For relational contracting w i th outside suppl iers , w e argue the 
reverse: As asset specif ici ty increases, governance becomes 
weaker rather than stronger. A l though relational contracting 
lowers conflict resulting f rom asset special izat ion (Williamson, 
1979), its effectiveness is based on supp l ie rs ' expectations 
rather than on the force of organizational author i ty . Since, in 
transaction-cost theory, expectat ions do not bind as strongly 
as authority (Dow, 1987), increasing asse t speci f ic i ty exposes 
the latent incompatibil ity be tween the corporat ion 's interests 
and those of outside suppliers. Relational contract ing prac-
tices are therefore strained. Therefore our hypothes is is as 
fol lows: 
Hypothes is 1 (H1): The effect of supplier asset specificity on trans-
action costs will be lower within a multidivisional corporation than in 
relational contracting with market suppliers. 
Preselection investment in technology. Potent ial suppliers 
may invest in new technology to increase the probabil i ty that 
they wil l be selected to supply the input. Howeve r , once the 
supplier is chosen, this investment may in f luence subsequent 
conflict wi th the buyer. To signal c o m m i t m e n t to the buyer 
and influence the select ion decision, part of the supplier 's in-
vestment should not be redeployable (Klein and Leffler, 1981; 
Will iamson, 1983). 1 Since, by H 1 , the adaptat ion costs asso-
ciated wi th these specif ic assets (Wi l l iamson, 1985: 179) 
should be better managed wi th in the organizat ion than in the 
market, w e hypothesize: 
Hypothes is 2 (H2): The effect of supplier preselection investment 
in technology on transaction costs should be lower for relationships 
between profit centers than in relational contracting with outside 
suppliers. 
Supplier market competition. Supplier asset specif ic i ty and 
supplier market compet i t ion have o f ten been confounded 
(Walker and Weber, 1984). In fact, a lmos t by def in i t ion, as 
supplier assets become more special ized, t he compet i t ive-
ness of the supplier market should decrease. However , the 
argument for the ef fect of market compe t i t i on on transaction 
costs is somewhat dif ferent f rom that of asset specif icity. 
Since the availability of compet i tors makes it easier for the 
buyer to switch suppliers, it raises the credib i l i ty of a buyer's 
threats to terminate the relationship. The m o r e credible the 
threat of termination, the less the suppl ier shou ld haggle with 
the buyer over adaptation costs. However , th is proposit ion 
should not be equally t rue for relat ionships b e t w e e n profit 
centers and relational contract ing w i t h ou ts ide suppl iers. 
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Wil l iamson (1985: 151) argued that organizations have a bias 
toward maintain ing authori ty over internal transactions, what-
ever the level of asset specialization. Corporate encourage-
ment to buy inside may also reflect the need to maintain 
vo lume in s o m e inputs, e.g., labor and capital, or functions, 
e.g., advert is ing and basic research, that have large econ-
omies of scale. Thus, an internal procurement bias would 
lower the threat of terminat ion for profit centers. Conversely, 
in market supply, both the authority relation and economies of 
scale in inputs and funct ions are absent. The ancillary costs of 
terminat ion are thus reduced and the credibil i ty of termination 
threats increased. W e thus hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The influence of supplier market competition on 
transaction costs should be lower for relationships between profit 
centers than in relational contracting with outside suppliers. 
The Comparability of Interprofit Center Relationships and 
Relational Contracting 
Our hypotheses assume that differences be tween internal 
and external suppliers are not due to variation in the tech-
nology of t he inputs suppl ied. Technological di f ferences may 
be related to the product life cycle (Harrigan, 1983) or to 
management ' s choice of technology to increase demand for 
the end product (Riordan and Wil l iamson, 1985). Such differ-
ences are impor tant , since they may inf luence the supplier's 
value to t he corporat ion. 
In markets in wh i ch n e w technology determines product suc-
cess, per fo rmance is higher the earlier in a technology's life 
cycle e f fec t ive interunit adaptation occurs. The corporation is 
therefore likely to coordinate relationships w i th specialized 
suppliers more extensively when their technologies are new. 
If asset specialization for inside and outside suppliers occurs 
at d i f ferent stages in the life cycle, the corporation wi l l value 
the relat ionships w i t h these suppliers dif ferently. The results 
for H1 w i l l therefore be biased. 
The dynamics of supplier market compet i t ion are also likely to 
differ across the stages of the technology life cycle (Stigler, 
1951 ; Harrigan, 1983). Technology diffusion and entry of new 
f i rms into t he market are important for compet i t ion in the 
early stage of an industry; but in the mature stage, competi-
t ion is shaped by increasing consolidation. If the dynamics of 
compet i t ion di f fer be tween profit centers and outside sup-
pliers, it is possible the results for H3 wi l l be biased. 
Fur thermore, managers may choose among dif ferent technol-
ogies to enhance demand for the end product (Riordan and 
Wi l l iamson, 1985). If the choice of a technology determines 
the degree of asset specif ici ty and is made simultaneously 
w i th the decis ion whe the r to make or buy (Wil l iamson, 1985: 
89), then inputs suppl ied wi th in the corporation may differ 
technological ly f r o m those produced by outside suppliers. 
Since economic losses due to interunit confl ict wi l l be higher 
for technologies that enhance demand, technological differ-
ences b e t w e e n inside and outside suppliers may confound 
H1 and H3. To control for the effect of technology, w e predict 
both asset speci f ic i ty and market compet i t ion by an input's 
technological age. Age of technology relates both to the 
product life cycle and to demand-enhancing features of the 
input. W e compare these predictions across profi t centers 
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and market suppliers to identi fy technological dif ferences be-
tween them. 
METHOD 
Research Setting 
The assembly division. W e stud ied the supply relationships 
of one large assembly division (over t w o billion dollars in rev-
enues) in a very large U.S. manufactur ing corporation. The di-
vision produces a number of consumer products for sale to 
the corporation's cus tomers . The consumer products vary in 
design but are suff ic ient ly similar to be built f rom a generic 
set of about 250 inputs. In addi t ion to having design differ-
ences, inputs may be manufac tured w i t h varying grades of 
material that affect the quali ty of the consumer product. 
The design, product ion, and market ing of consumer products 
are organized through product programs wi th in the assembly 
division. These programs fo rm an important subdimension of 
the division's st ructure, w h i c h is organized first around func-
tions, e.g., engineering, market ing, and operat ions. Pur-
chasing personnel w i th in the operat ions depar tment establish 
and manage relat ionships w i t h suppl iers, both inside and out-
side the corporat ion. The purchasing funct ion is organized 
first by product program and then by type of input, e.g., elec-
tronics, plastic mold ings. 
Supply relationships with component manufacturing divi-
sions. Over 50 percent of the inputs to the assembly division 
come f rom component -manufac tur ing divisions, operated as 
profit centers, w i th in the corporat ion. The component divi-
sions sell their ou tput to the assembly division, to other cor-
porate units, and to cus tomers in the market outside the 
corporation. Supply relat ionships b e t w e e n the assembly divi-
sion and component divisions w e r e virtually mandated until 
several years before the present s tudy was initiated (see 
Eccles, 1985, for a descr ipt ion of inter-profi t-center con-
tracting modes). At that t ime, corporate management per-
ceived that the product ion costs of the assembly division's 
product-market compet i to rs w e r e lower than the assembly 
division's costs for products of equal quality. Lower costs 
meant that these compet i to rs w e r e earning a greater financial 
return than the assembly division. They w e r e also a threat to 
the assembly divis ion's market share. Market share in turn 
was a critical determinant of the divis ion's costs because of 
the large economies of scale required for eff icient operations. 
Furthermore, it w a s apparent that compet i tors w e r e less ver-
tically integrated than the corporat ion investigated here. Since 
a major source of the assembly division's costs were inputs 
f rom the component divisions, it w a s necessary to assess the 
production-cost compet i t i veness of these divisions. The cor-
poration therefore released the assembly division f rom its 
mandated relationships w i t h the component divisions and al-
lowed it to force t h e m to compe te w i t h potential outside 
suppliers. This n e w pol icy of exchange autonomy (Eccles, 
1985) created a more adversarial a tmosphere be tween the 
assembly division and the componen t divisions than had ex-
isted under the policy of mandated relationships. 
Relationships with outside suppliers. A t the t ime of our 
study the assembly div is ion's relat ionships w i th its outside 
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suppliers strongly resembled MacNei l 's (1978) concept of re-
lational contract ing. This resemblance was due to a policy the 
assembly division had implemented, three years before our 
data w e r e col lected, to reduce its supplier base and change 
its practices for managing suppliers. Under the new policy, 
the assembly division moved f rom compet i t ive bidding to a 
system based on the assembly division's target price for the 
input. In addit ion, before the n e w policies were implemented, 
suppliers w e r e contractually obl igated to absorb changes in 
material costs. The n e w policies replaced this obligation w i th 
negotiated adjustments based on an evaluation of supplier 
costs. Suppliers, moreover, w e r e expected to improve their 
productivi ty and quality continuously. These changes in-
creased the level of information exchange w i th suppliers, 
especially regarding costs. The relationship wi th the supplier, 
under these te rms, was expected to last for the duration of 
the consumer-product program, wh ich could exceed five 
years. Since the supplier was likely to be the only source of 
the input to the program, supplier expectations of a long-
te rm, exclusive relationship were created. These expectations 
were likely to lead suppliers to at tenuate short-term conflict 
over cost allocation, consistent w i th relational contracting be-
havior. 
The n e w policy was not risk-free. Since an outside supplier 
was likely to be the single source of an input, it was highly 
likely that the assets of the supplier wou ld become at least 
partly specialized over t ime to the assembly division's oper-
ating practices. More specialized assets would raise the divi-
sion's cost of swi tch ing to a new supplier if the current 
supplier per formed poorly. This potential attenuation of the 
supplier markets for the division's inputs may have also made 
it more dif f icult to assess the compet i t iveness of outside 
suppl iers ' per formance. 
To reduce the potential suppl ier-management problems asso-
ciated w i th high swi tching costs and low supplier market 
compet i t ion, the division chose suppliers that consistently 
per formed better than their compet i tors. The likelihood that 
future assembly-division requirements would be met effec-
tively w a s thereby increased, for t w o reasons: (1) the capa-
bilities of the suppliers were higher; and (2) the consistent 
high per formance of the suppliers represented an investment 
in reputat ion that wou ld be damaged if they began to take 
advantage of their new close relationship w i th the assembly 
division. Finally, because an outside supplier chosen in the 
supplier-reduction program was likely to deliver more than 
one input to the division and was expected to meet all of the 
division's demand for each input, the division consti tuted a 
larger percentage of the supplier's total volume. The divi-
sion's bargaining posit ion in confl icts w i th the supplier was 
thereby increased. 
B a c k g r o u n d f ie ld research. To ground our theory in the ex-
perience of assembly division managers, w e interviewed per-
sonnel in purchasing, engineering, and logistics over a period 
of three years. The supplier-reduction program and exchange-
autonomy policy w i th component divisions were imple-
mented during this period. Five group meet ings were held 
w i t h purchasing and engineering managers. In these 
meetings the managers presented cases il lustrating the de-
terminants of both in-house and outs ide supplier perfor-
mance. These cases provided impor tant data on the type of 
information purchasing managers had about suppliers and on 
their perceptions of ef fect ive suppl ier relationships. During 
the last t w o years of this f ield research w e visited a compo-
nent division to investigate d i f ferences be tween selling inside 
and outside the corporat ion. W e also observed the extent to 
which the component division made its investment decisions 
in response to assembly-division requi rements. Finally, over 
an eight-month period during the third year, w e observed 
weekly meet ings be tween assembly-division personnel and 
market suppliers that w e r e part of the assembly division's 
cost-reduction program. The interv iew, case, and observation 
data gathered during th is phase of the study suggested that 
the theory proposed above was closely applicable to the sup-
pl ier-management problems of the assembly division. These 
data also suggested h o w to operationalize our variables. 
Variables 
Transaction costs. W e def ined transact ion costs as the diffi-
culty experienced by the assembly division in reaching agree-
ment w i th its suppliers on the allocation of adjustment costs. 
Difficulty in reaching interunit agreement on cost allocation 
specifically measures the intensity of bargaining over adjust-
ment costs. Al though the structure and intensity of the bar-
gaining situation may be af fected by institutional factors, as 
w e hypothesize, they do not de termine its definit ion or mea-
surement. Thus w e believe that our narrow operationalization 
of transaction costs excludes any obvious confounding by in-
stitutional factors and thus addresses the cri t iques of both 
Demsetz (1988) and D o w (1987) regarding transaction-cost 
measurement. Demsetz (1988) asserted that the costs an or-
ganization incurs in managing its resources are not compa-
rable to transaction costs. He def ined management costs 
quite broadly, more as general administrat ive costs than as 
expenses related to coordinat ing specif ic activit ies. Transac-
t ion costs, however, are def ined narrowly as the "cos ts of 
negot iat ing" in relationships w i t h suppliers (Demsetz: 151, 
note 5). Similarly, D o w (1987) argued that in both organiza-
tions and markets the assessment of interunit agreement 
must be separated f rom the inst i tut ional resources required 
to achieve it. This impl ies that the eff iciency of transactions 
should be compared across inst i tut ions, independent of the 
institutional factors that shape transact ion characteristics 
(Dow, 1987: 19). If this criterion is not met , Demsetz 's cri-
t ique of transaction-cost theory in te rms of the incomparabi-
lity of management and transaction costs mus t be reckoned 
w i th . 
Dow also argued that interunit adaptat ion and agreement on 
how it should be achieved are important e lements in evalu-
ating the eff iciency of interunit relationships. Our definit ion of 
transaction costs combines these e lements . Ad jus tment 
costs in supply relationships represent the costs of adaptation 
directly and are a focal point of suppl ier-management practice 
because of price compet i t ion in the assembly division's 
product market. Agreement over cost allocation is an impor-
tant goal of negotiations w i t h suppliers, since it is a condition 
for effect ive adaptation. 
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W e measu red al location difficulties for t w o causes of adjust-
men t cos t : eng ineer ing changes and changes in the costs of 
raw mater ia l inputs t o component fabrication. Engineering 
changes and changes in material costs have di f ferent or ig ins, 
but bo th may lead to higher transaction costs. Engineering 
changes or iginate in t he assembly division but are not under 
the cont ro l of divis ion purchasing. Purchasing does exper i -
ence, however , the ensuing confl ict w i t h the supplier over the 
ad jus tment costs associated w i th the changes. In contrast , 
material cost changes originate in the markets supplying t he 
div is ion's suppl iers. A division supplier must decide w h e t h e r 
to absorb the costs and lower its profits or a t tempt to pass 
t hem on to the assemb ly division by requesting a price in-
crease. Our measures of transaction costs are (1) the di f f i -
culty of ag reement w i t h the supplier on the allocation of cos ts 
due t o engineer ing changes for the part (measured on a 7-
point Likert- type scale) and (2) the diff iculty of agreement 
w i th the suppl ier on t h e allocation of costs due to changes in 
material cos ts for t he part (measured on a 7-point L ikert - type 
scale). 
Asset specificity. Asse t specif icity has been operat ional ized in 
many w a y s (Wi l l iamson, 1985: chap. 4). W e measured t he 
construct in t e r m s of t he uniqueness of the suppl ier 's t ech -
nical labor skil ls and manufactur ing equ ipment for produc ing 
the product del ivered to the assembly division. This opera-
t ionalization is cons is ten t w i th Klein, Crawford, and Alch ian 
(1978: 300) , w h o argued that unique assets enable suppl iers 
to appropr iate quasi-rents in the contract ing process, and w i t h 
Walker and W e b e r (1984), w h o used supplier proprietary 
technology as an (inverse) measure of supplier market c o m -
pet i t ion. W e measured asset specif ici ty as (1) the ex ten t t o 
wh ich the product ion of the part requires technical labor ski l ls 
that are relatively un ique to the supplier (measured on a 7-
point L ikert - type scale) and (2) the extent to wh ich the pro-
duct ion of t he part requires manufactur ing equ ipment tha t is 
relatively un ique to t h e supplier (measured on a 7-point 
Likert- type scale). 
Preselection investment in technology. W e operat ional ized 
supplier preselect ion investment in n e w technology w i t h one 
measure. Our hypothes is for supplier technology i nves tmen t 
requires tha t t he i nves tmen t be made in order to increase t he 
suppl ier 's chances of select ion. If the investment w a s m a d e 
for o ther reasons, the proport ion of nonredeployable assets is 
likely to be smal l . W e measured whe the r the supplier in-
vested in n e w techno logy to increase the likelihood of be ing 
selected as a suppl ier for this category of part (measured as 
yes or no). 
Supplier market competition. Walker and Weber ' s (1984) 
supplier marke t compe t i t i on construct w a s measured in part 
by variables that d e n o t e d the degree of compet i t ion di rect ly . 
These variables w e r e highly correlated (coeff icient alpha = .7 
for th ree variables) and had strong predict ive validity. W e 
chose to measure the variable that w a s most correlated w i t h 
the cons t ruc t (r = .975) as our indicator of supplier marke t 
compet i t ion in the p resen t study: the extent to wh i ch the re 
are enough potent ia l suppl iers to ensure adequate c o m p e t i -
t ion at the c o m m o d i t y level for the provision of the input (on 
a 7-point Likert- type scale). 
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Age of input technology. W e operat ional ized the age of input 
technology w i t h t w o variables that focus on the input 's de-
sign and manufactur ing process: (1) the newness of the de-
sign technology of the input (measured on a 7-point 
Likert-type scale) and (2) the n e w n e s s of the manufacturing 
process used to produce the input (measured on a 7-point 
Likert-type scale). 
Data Co l lec t ion 
S a m p l e se lec t ion . W e chose our sample of supplier relation-
ships by drawing a random subset of 100 f rom the assembly 
division's 250 generic inputs. To col lect data about the sup-
plier relationships for this sample , w e focused on supplier re-
lationships for t w o consumer-product programs in the 
assembly division. Both of these programs we re affected by 
the assembly division's n e w pol icies regarding the selection 
and management of suppl iers both inside and outs ide the 
corporation. 
Ques t i onna i re da ta . W e cons t ruc ted a questionnaire for dis-
tr ibut ion to the purchasing managers of the assembly division 
w h o w e r e responsible for se lect ing and managing suppliers 
for the t w o programs. During the per iod of background field 
work for the study, purchasing managers had demonstrated 
substantial knowledge about the divis ion's internal suppliers 
and its external supplier markets . A subset of these managers 
rev iewed the quest ionnaire to evaluate the accuracy and rele-
vance of its concepts and language. The operationalizations of 
the variables listed above ref lect the judgments of these 
managers. Af ter review, the quest ionnaire was distr ibuted to 
purchasing managers w h o w e r e asked to provide information 
on relationships w i t h suppl iers for each input in the sample. 
W e received usable quest ionnai res on 99 inputs. Forty-four 
inputs we re procured f r o m internal prof i t centers and 55 from 
outside suppliers. Th i r ty - two of t hese inputs w e r e repeated 
for both consumer-product programs. Consequently, w e re-
ceived informat ion on 67 of the 100 inputs in our random 
sample . 2 Eighty-nine percent of the market suppliers in our 
sample w e r e single-source suppl iers and all but one of the 
remaining 11 percent had cont racts that guaranteed a fixed 
percentage of the div is ion's vo lume . 
K e y - i n f o r m a n t b ias. W e measured the variables by using 
managers ' responses to quest ionnai re i tems. The use of this 
kind of subject ive data has been c o m m o n in research on 
transaction costs (Mon teverde and Teece, 1982; Anderson 
and Schmit t le in, 1984; Mas ten , 1984; Walker and Weber, 
1984); and al though none of these studies has measured 
transaction costs direct ly, their resul ts have s h o w n strong 
construct and predict ive validity for transaction-cost deter-
minants. However , there are several causes for concern 
about using subject ive data. 
Results f r om analyses of variables measured using subjective 
responses may have l imi ted external validity because they 
may be confounded by perceptual bias. Our use of purchasing 
managers as key in formants may bias our results toward the 
perspect ive of this funct ion in the assembly division. How-
ever, Heide and John (1990) f ound in industrial components 
industr ies that buyers ' and suppl iers ' percept ions of the de-
gree to wh i ch suppl ier assets w e r e specialized w e r e strongly 
2 
To see whether the subsample of 67 was 
representative, we compared the propor-
tions of in-house and market suppliers in 
this sample to their proportions in the 
sample of 100. The proportions were not 
statistically different between the two 
samples. 
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and s igni f icant ly corre lated. Their results indicate that the 
buyers have ex tens ive and reliable knowledge of the supplier 
market , t he kind of know ledge the assembly division's pur-
chasing personnel displayed in our conversat ions w i th t hem. 
He ide and John 's f ind ings also suggest that the emphasis 
t ransact ion-cost s tud ies place on the judgmen t of the buying 
unit is not misp laced. Transact ion-cost research on vertical in-
tegra t ion has typical ly focused on the buyer, since the buyer's 
exper iences and interpretat ions of the suppl ier 's behavior de-
t e rm ine subsequen t integrat ion or deintegrat ion decisions. 
The s igni f icant correlat ion of the buyer 's and supplier's judg-
m e n t s of suppl ier asset specialization provides evidence that 
the buyer can accurately perceive the causes of potential 
suppl ier oppo r tun i sm. 
Key- in formant bias may also be present due to dif ferences in 
the suppl ier se lect ion and management practices of the t w o 
consumer -p roduc t programs to wh ich our respondents be-
long. W e tes ted for these di f ferences, as described below. 
Finally, each manager may have his or her o w n bias in re-
spond ing to our ins t rument . Unfor tunately, because informa-
t ion on each product in our sample w a s provided by a single 
manager , w e w e r e unable to separate t rue information about 
the p roduc t f r o m systemat ic respondent bias due to individual 
d i f fe rences . Since our quest ions referred to objective phe-
nomena in managers ' exper iences w i t h suppliers and were 
clearly unders tood by our respondents, w e feel conf ident that 
sub jec t ive bias in our data should be low. Nonetheless, w e 
addressed this p rob lem in a variety of ways , as discussed 
be low . 
Analysis 
Hypothesis testing. W e represented the hypotheses as a 
mult ip le- indicator structural equat ion mode l (Bagozzi and 
Phil l ips, 1982) es t ima ted using the maximum-l ikel ihood 
m e t h o d of LISREL VI (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1984). The 
mode l for the hypotheses , using our measures, is presented 
in Figure 1 . In Figure 2 w e present the model using Greek 
let ters, by convent ion , to represent the parameters w e est i-
ma ted . 
W e tes ted the hypo theses by constraining the parameter 
represent ing a hypothesized relationship to be equal for both 
groups of suppl iers, then al lowing the parameter to be dif-
fe ren t b e t w e e n the groups. The di f ference in chi-square be-
t w e e n these t w o es t imates of a parameter indicates whe the r 
the re is a d i f fe rence b e t w e e n profit centers and market sup-
pl iers. 
Comparison of means for types of supplier. By analyzing 
the m o m e n t s matr ices of profit centers and market suppliers 
w e t es ted our hypotheses and compared the means of the 
t w o t ypes of suppl iers at the same t ime (see Joreskog and 
S o r b o m , 1984 : chap. 5; Byrne, Shavelson, and Muthen , 
1989). The means w e r e compared on the f ive constructs in 
our m o d e l : d i f f icul ty in allocating ad jus tment costs, asset 
speci f ic i ty , preselect ion investment in technology, supplier 
marke t compe t i t i on , and age of input technology. This test 
repl icates t he convent ional transact ion-cost assessment of 
the organizat ion-market d ichotomy. To the extent that the 
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Figure 1. Input technology and predictors of transaction costs. 
means of the t w o types of supplier do not differ on these 
constructs, the market-organization d ichotomy is blurred. 
Jackknife estimates of the parameters. Maximum-l ikel ihood 
est imation of structural equat ion models assumes that each 
variable has a normal distr ibut ion. However, Mon te Carlo 
tests have shown that a l though the est imates are robust for 
strong violations of this assumpt ion (Sharma, Durvasula, and 
Dillon, 1989), the standard errors of these est imates are not 
robust. Since our variables clearly violate the assumpt ion of 
multivariate normality, w e jackknifed (Mostel ler and Tukey, 
1977: chap. 7) the maximum-l ikel ihood results to obtain new 
est imates and standard errors that are not based on distr ibu-
tional assumpt ions. 
Model specification. To el iminate a Heywood case (an esti-
mate of a negative variance) that appeared in our initial run 
(for 5 2 in Figure 2), w e est imated the parameters in the model 
fo l lowing R indskopfs (1984) method . Following Rindskopf, 
w e reconstructed the model so that error te rms w e r e est i -
mated as exogenous variables; the parameters est imat ing the 
error te rms were then squared to calculate the error vari-
ances, wh ich could not be negative. However, for simplicity, 
the results are reported using the notation in the model 
shown in Figure 2. 
Assessment of key-informant bias. W e assessed potential 
key- informant bias in our results in three ways. First, it is 
possible that bias w a s introduced because respondents be-
longed to the t w o product programs that may have di f fered 
on unobservable characterist ics. W e assessed this potent ial 
confounding of our results by regressing the two programs on 
all the variables in a logistic regression. If these variables pre-
76/ASQ, March 1991 
Transaction Costs 
Equipment 
Uniqueness 
Labor 
Uniqueness 
> f 
Product 
Design 
Newness 
1 \ 
+ 1 
+ 1 
7 i . 
i|i2 
Asset 
Uniqueness 
Technology 
Newness 
72 I Investment 
in Technology 
\ 2 
> f 
Process 
Design 
Newness 
I 
Preselection 
Investment in 
Technology 
73 
Supplier 
Market 
Competition, 
> 
Potential 
Suppliers 
Engineering 
Change Cost 
Allocation 
p 6 7 Material 
Cost 
Allocation 
1 
Material 
Cost 
Allocation 
*56 
*6 
diet the programs, thereby indicating significant differences 
be tween them, the programs may confound the structural 
equation model results. Second, key-informant bias might be 
present in the effect of outliers on the maximum-l ikel ihood 
est imates. The jackknife procedure assesses this effect. The 
closer the jackknife est imates are to the maximum-l ikel ihood 
values, the less likely it is that problem outliers exist in the 
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data . Finally, key- informant bias might be mani fested through 
cor re la ted measurement error (Phillips, 1981). If the fit of our 
m o d e l to the data is good w i t h o u t speci fy ing correlated mea-
s u r e m e n t error, wha teve r bias m igh t exist adds little to the 
exp lanatory power of the mode l . To assess the goodness of 
f i t o f the model to the data, w e report the x 2 goodness-of-f it 
t e s t using the maximum- l ike l ihood es t imates . This test is a 
r o u g h approximat ion of f i t , s ince it is sensi t ive to sample size 
and assumes that the data are mul t ivar iate normal. Conse-
quen t l y , w e also used the Type II pars imonious normed-f i t 
i ndex (Mulaik et al., 1989), wh i ch takes into account both 
s a m p l e size and the pars imony of the mode l . 
R E S U L T S 
T h e correlat ion matr ices, means , and standard deviations of 
t h e variables are s h o w n in Table 1. The correlation matrices 
f o r prof i t centers and ou ts ide suppl iers indicate that the t w o 
t y p e s of transaction costs , a l though signif icantly correlated, 
a re not adequate indicators of a single construct . The correla-
t i o n s b e t w e e n the t w o variables are not high enough to sug-
g e s t a st rong coef f ic ient of reliabil ity. Fur thermore, the 
corre la t ions b e t w e e n the t w o indicators and the other vari-
Table 1 
Means, S tandard Dev ia t ions and Corre la t ions 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Profit centers 
1 Product design 
newness 3.33 1.38 -
2 Process design 
newness 3.20 1.69 .79 -
3 Labor 
uniqueness 3.81 1.71 .43 .50 -
4 Equipment 
uniqueness 4.64 2.09 .46 .50 .34 -
5 Investment in 
technology 1.61 50 - . 4 5 - . 7 1 - . 4 2 - . 4 1 -
6 Supplier market 
competit ion 3.93 1.60 - . 0 8 - . 0 2 - . 5 2 - . 6 2 .08 -
7 Engineering cost 
allocation 3.34 1.77 - . 1 5 - . 1 0 .11 23 - . 0 4 - . 5 5 -
8 Material cost 
allocation 2.89 1.56 - . 2 9 - . 2 6 - . 3 6 - . 4 2 .03 .01 .30 
Outside suppliers 
1 Product design 
newness 2.80 1.78 -
2 Process design 
newness 2.46 1.59 73 -
3 Labor 
uniqueness 3.19 1.91 33 .46 -
4 Equipment 
uniqueness 3.61 2.00 53 .64 60 -
5 Investment 
technology 1.71 .46 - . 1 6 - . 4 0 - . 3 1 - . 3 2 -
6 Supplier market 
competi t ion 5.10 1.56 - . 3 6 - . 1 9 - . 0 8 - . 4 5 .17 -
7 Engineering cost 
.02 - . 2 9 - . 0 0 allocation 2.80 1.69 .23 .31 .19 -
8 Material cost 
- . 1 0 .58 allocation 2.76 1.60 .06 .20 .28 .25 - . 3 9 
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ables are clearly di f ferent in magnitude, suggest ing l o w c o n -
current validity and strong potential for interpretat ional 
confounding (Burt, 1976). Consequently, w e pred ic ted each 
indicator separately. To control for potential bias due t o 
common measurement properties of the t w o t ransac t ion -cos t 
indicators, w e est imated the covariance b e t w e e n the i r m e a -
surement errors <€5 6). 
Table 2 presents the results for construct val idat ion. T h e co -
variance be tween the indicators of transact ion costs ( e 5 6 ) is 
statistically signif icant and does not dif fer across the t w o 
types of supplier (x2dif-, = .78, p = .62). This result s u g g e s t s 
that both measures are related to an unobserved c o n s t r u c t , 
but not strongly enough so that it const i tu tes a latent var iab le 
in the model . The implications of this f inding for t he m e a -
surement of transaction costs are elaborated be low. 
The results also show that our measures of asset u n i q u e n e s s 
have signif icantly less error in profit centers than in o u t s i d e 
suppliers (x 2 dif 3 = 11.3, p = .01). However , the rel iabi l i ty o f 
the construct (Bagozzi, 1980: 181) in each group is accep tab le 
(.89 for the profit centers; .78 for the outside suppl iers) . T h e 
t w o types of suppliers do not differ in the m e a s u r e m e n t o f 
technology newness (x 2 dif 3 = 7.09, p = .07; rel iabil i ty = .87). 
Table 3 shows that the t w o types of suppliers d i f fer in the i r 
mean values only for the construct of market c o m p e t i t i o n . 
Profit centers have lower compet i t ion than market supp l i e rs , 
consistent w i t h Walker and Weber 's (1984) resul ts. T h e s e 
f indings support our assertion that the t w o types of s u p p l y 
relationships are embedded in hybrid inst i tut ions. 
Table 4 shows the f indings for the three hypotheses and 
other causal paths. H1 is supported: asset un iqueness leads 
Table 2 
Maximum-L ike l ihood Estimates for Construct Validation of Technology Newness, Asset Uniqueness, and 
Transact ion Costs* 
Jackknife X 2 Di f ference 
Unstandardized Standardized estimate of between prof i t centers 
Parameter M.LE. M.LE. M.LE. and outside supp l ie rs 
Technology newness 7.09 
1.00 .76 -
X 2 1.36 1.00 1.78t (.14) 
&1 1.07 .65 -8 2 0.00 0.00 -Asset uniqueness 11.3* 
Profit centers 
1.00 .75 -1.45 .96 1.44t (.12) 
.87 .21 -
.46 .04 -Outside suppliers 
1.00 .75 -
^ 4 1.49 .99 1.56t (.12) 
* 1 1.49 .62 -.45 .04 -
Transaction costs 
€ 5 6 .44 .44 .42t (.06) .78 
• p < .05. 
* Standard errors are in parentheses, 
t |T| > 2. 
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Table 3 
Differences in Construct Means between Profit Centers and Outside Suppliers 
Unstandardized Standardized Jackknife Jackknife 
Variable M.LE. M.LE. of M.LE. S.E. 
Technology newness .55 .44 .36 .27 
Asset uniqueness .34 .24 .39 .26 
Investment in technology .02 .04 .03 .06 
Supplier market competition - .81 - . 4 7 - . 8 2 * .26 
Engineering cost allocation - . 16 - . 0 9 - . 1 6 .60 
Material cost allocation .12 .07 .07 .33 
* |T| > 2. 
to lower interunit confl ict for prof i t centers than for outside 
suppliers (for engineering cost al locat ion, x 2 d i f i = 3.95, p = 
.047; for material cost al location, x2dif-, = 8 .51, p = .004). 
Interestingly, higher levels of asset uniqueness lead to lower 
levels of conflict for profit centers but have no effect on con-
flict for outside suppliers (compare est imates of p 3 and (34 
between the t w o types of suppl iers). 
In contrast, both H2 and H3 are d isconf i rmed. Preselection 
investment in technology leads to greater diff iculty in 
reaching interunit agreement regarding cost allocation (p 5 and 
(i 6) for both profit centers and outs ide suppliers. The coeff i-
cients are not significantly d i f ferent be tween the t w o types of 
suppliers (engineering cost al location, x 2 d i f i = 60, p = .44; 
material cost allocation, x2dif-! = .00, p = 1.0). Furthermore, 
contrary to expectations, suppl ier market compet i t ion predicts 
lower interunit confl ict for prof i t centers than for outside sup-
pliers (engineering cost al location, x 2 d i f i = 13.9, p = . 0 0 1 ; 
material cost allocation, x 2 d i f i = 5.78, p = .017). Like asset 
specificity, higher market compet i t i on leads to less confl ict 
(p 7 and p 8) for the componen t div is ions but has no effect for 
outside suppliers. 
The effects of technological age on asset specialization and 
supplier market compet i t ion do not vary be tween profit 
centers and outside suppliers (x2dif-, = .74, p = .39; and 
X2dif-i = .31, p = .58, respect ively). Thus, w e can be reason-
ably certain that technology d i f fe rences be tween the t w o 
types of suppliers do not bias our results. Interestingly, for 
both types of suppliers, newer techno logy relates to both 
greater asset uniqueness and greater supplier market compe-
tit ion (7-, and 7 3 , respectively). 
Asset uniqueness and suppl ier market compet i t ion are nega-
tively related ((32), as expected. But, contrary to expectat ion, 
preselection investment in techno logy does not affect asset 
uniqueness (p.,). These results are the same for both profit 
centers and outside suppliers (x 2 dif n = .27, p = . 6 1 ; and 
X 2 dif 1 = 1.07, p = . 31 , respect ively). 
Finally, key-informant bias does not appear to confound our 
f indings. The logistic regression results presented in Table 5 
show that none of the variables w e studied are related to the 
t w o product programs. Thus the programs are not an impor-
tant omit ted variable in the mode l . Also, in general, the jack-
knife values are reasonably c lose to the maximum-l ikel ihood 
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Table 4 
Results for Hypotheses 
Jackknife X2 Difference 
Un standardized Standardized estimate of between profit centers 
Parameter M.LE. M.LE. M.LE. and outside suppliers 
Hypothesis 1 
Profit centers 
P 3 - . 4 0 - . 3 2 - . 4 5 t (.17)* 3.9 # 
P.. - . 9 9 - . 8 8 - 1 . 0 3 t (.23) 8.5 # 
Outside suppliers 
P 3 .27 .21 .23 (.28) 
P4 .22 .19 .19 (.22) 
Hypothesis 2 
Ps - . 6 7 - . 1 8 - . 7 6 t (.20) .60 
P 6 - 1 . 0 9 - . 3 2 - 1 . 0 7 t (.31) .00 
Hypothesis 3 
Profit centers 
P7 - . 8 2 - . 8 0 - . 8 5 t (.18) 13.9* 
Pe - . 5 1 - . 5 5 - . 5 5 t (.21) 5.8 # 
Outside suppliers 
P 7 .13 .13 .11 (.22) 
.03 .04 - . 0 2 (.12) 
Estimates for other 
causal paths 
7 i .62 .54 .77t(.11) .74 
72 - . 2 2 - . 5 7 - . 2 9 t (.03) 3.75 
73 .42 .30 .52t (.21) .31 
Pi - . 2 3 .08 - . 2 6 (.39) 1.07 
- . 8 5 .69 - . 8 3 t (.15) .27 
Estimates for error terms 
<t>ii 1.19 .96 .83t (.09) 
1.07 .76 1.12t (.08) 
4>22 .39 .83 .39t (.02) 
^33 1.25 .72 1.56t (.24) 
4̂4 1.51 .86 1.57t (.17) 
*55 1.35 .85 1.33t (.15) 
• p < .05. 
* Standard errors are in parentheses, 
t |T| > 2. 
est imates, suggest ing that outliers are not a major contr ibutor 
to the results. 
The chi-square goodness of fit for the model shows that w e 
cannot reject it (x2dif44 = 52.99, p = .17). This stat ist ic sug-
gests that there is no unspecif ied systemat ic s t ructure of the 
Table 5 
Logistic Regression of Product Program on Product Technology and 
Predictors of Transaction Costs 
Variable Parameter S.E. X 2 P 
Intercept 2.15 2.17 .97 .33 
Supplier market competition - . 1 8 .20 .78 .38 
Labor uniqueness .17 .19 .86 .36 
Equipment uniqueness - . 2 5 .21 1.54 .22 
Investment in technology - . 0 4 .62 .00 .94 
Engineering cost allocation - . 0 2 .16 .02 .89 
Material cost allocation - . 0 4 .17 .04 .83 
Product design newness - . 1 2 .23 .30 .58 
Process design newness - . 1 9 .27 .54 .46 
Likelihood ratio: x 2 (59 d.f.) = 91.03; p = .005. 
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error te rms that might represent key-informant bias. A lso, the 
Type II parsimonious normed goodness of f i t index is .96. The 
model is thus a good f i t to the data, controll ing for the 
number of parameters est imated and our small sample size. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Do organizations and markets govern transactions differently? 
Our answer is a highly qualif ied yes. The basic proposi t ion of 
transaction-cost economics is sound: supplier asset spec i -
ficity w i th in the corporat ion is associated w i th lower transac-
tion costs than asset specif ic i ty in the market. However , our 
results stretch and reshape the theory in ways that partially 
support its crit ics. These changes are related to the hybr id 
characteristics of the organization and markets w e s tud ied. 
Decentralization in the corporation and relational contract ing 
w i th market suppliers af fect supplier relations in ways that 
strike at traditional research on transaction costs. The means 
of the profit centers and outside suppliers differ only in their 
degree of market compet i t ion . Thus a conventional test of 
transaction-cost theory, wh ich compares the level of asse t 
specif icity inside and outs ide an organization, wou ld fai l . This 
failure supports a rguments (Stinchcombe, 1983; Eccles and 
Whi te , 1988) that hybrid organizations and markets are more 
similar than transact ion-cost theory proposes. Moreover , be-
cause in-house and market supply have the same level of in-
terunit confl ict, a process of institutional selection based on 
transaction costs w o u l d not favor one type of supplier over 
the other. 
Al though in-house and market supply relationships appear to 
be hybrid or nonstandard, H1 is supported. This result is con-
founded neither by age of technology nor by extent of c o m -
peti t ion. W e infer that the coordination mechanisms the 
division uses to manage specialized inputs in-house are 
simply more ef fect ive than the mechanisms available in the 
market. This is the essence of the transaction-cost t heo ry of 
vertical integrat ion. However , because support of H1 m a y be 
related to better in-house management of new techno log ies 
rather than to specialized assets, w e est imated the d i rec t re-
lationship be tween age of technology and both types of cos t 
allocation. The es t imates we re not significant (x 2 d i f 1 = .53, 
for engineering change cost allocation diff icult ies; x 2 d i f i = 
.52, for material cost allocation difficulties). 
How much in-house coordination mechanisms represent t h e 
old centralized control of profit-center relationships, as o p -
posed to n e w practices, has important implications for inter-
preting the results for H 1 . Two examples, both focused o n 
the relationship be tween new technology and asset spec ia l -
ization, highlight the di f ference between old and n e w m e c h a -
nisms. One important, enduring old practice is that a large, 
relatively powerfu l central ized engineering staff coord ina tes 
the deve lopment of n e w technologies in the componen t d iv i -
sions. Technologies that create unique assets are especia l ly 
salient, since they give the corporation a potential edge ove r 
its compet i tors . The corporation gains, however, only if a 
componen t division adapts a technology successful ly to an 
assembly division's needs. For this reason, and because suc-
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3 
Regressions show a significant relation-
ship between early sourcing and asset 
uniqueness (p < .10) for profit centers, 
controlling for technology newness, but 
no relationship for outside suppliers. Like 
technology newness, early sourcing has 
no direct effect on transaction costs. 
4 
Williamson's theory (1975: chap. 8; 1985: 
chap. 11) regarding the efficiency of the 
multidivisional form addresses the 
problem of reducing unnecessary coordi-
nation between divisions rather than im-
proving necessary coordination. 
cessfu l adaptat ion of the technology leads to learning about 
its general izabil i ty, staff engineers have an incentive to help 
resolve prob lems b e t w e e n the profit centers and the as-
semb ly div is ion. W e f requent ly observed staff engineers in 
consul tat ive roles, bo th in the assembly division and in the 
componen t divisions. No such role for these engineers w a s 
observed in relat ionships w i t h outs ide suppliers. 
An examp le of a n e w coordinat ion mechanism developed to 
improve the e f fec t iveness of suppl ier operations, both inside 
and outs ide the corporat ion, is "ear ly sourc ing, " wh ich has 
long been a pract ice in Japanese manufactur ing f i rms (see 
Rubinger, 1985) and is becoming w ide ly adopted by U.S. 
manufactur ing organizations (Purchasing Magazine, 1985). 
The major goals of early sourcing are to utilize the supplier's 
technological exper t ise and to create a product design com-
patible w i t h the suppl ier 's manufactur ing facilit ies, leading to 
lower costs and higher quality. Suppliers participating in early 
sourc ing are brought into the process of developing a product 
ei ther as it is being designed by the buyer 's engineers or as 
the techno logy itself is being developed. This practice con-
trasts w i t h tradit ional supplier involvement, wh ich typically 
occurs af ter the f irst product prototype is made, long after 
techno logy deve lopment and product design have been c o m -
p le ted. Early sourcing gives the buyer more information about 
the suppl ier 's capabil i t ies and its cost structure. Furthermore, 
inputs that are early-sourced f rom component divisions tend 
to be produced w i t h more unique assets than early-sourced 
inputs f r om outs ide suppl iers. 3 Therefore, because of better 
in format ion, negot iat ions over cost allocation for unique 
assets in the prof i t centers may be less diff icult than negotia-
t ions for comparable assets in outs ide suppliers. 
W e cannot say w h e t h e r H1 is supported because of the ves-
t iges of central izat ion or the successful management of de-
central izat ion, or bo th . If only old centralized practices are 
ef fect ive and they decl ine as decentral ization takes hold, w e 
w o u l d expect to see transact ion costs rise in the corporat ion. 
If e f fec t ive n e w pract ices can replace the old, then transac-
t ion cos ts w i l l remain lower for unique assets in the corpora-
t ion. 
These alternat ive scenarios for interunit coordination s h o w 
that our results for H1 support the transaction-cost f rame-
work more as a theory of organization design than as a theory 
predict ing changes in the boundary of the f i rm. The important 
d i f ference b e t w e e n transaction-cost theory and other theo-
ries of organization design is that it compares relationships 
w i th in an organization to market contract ing. The theory is s i -
lent, however , on h o w to compare coordination mechan isms 
b e t w e e n organizations or w i th in the same organization over 
t i m e . 4 Such a compar ison wou ld be a necessary part of ana-
lyzing a single organization's move f rom central to decentral-
ized contro l over suppl ier relations. Further deve lopment of 
the theory is there fore required to address the issues our 
suppor t ive f indings raise. 
It s e e m s clear, moreover, that al though H1 is suppor ted, the 
corporat ion is unl ikely to vertically integrate specialized out -
side suppl iers. By lower ing the potential for opportunist ic be-
havior, relational contract ing reduces the transaction costs 
83/ASQ, March 1991 
associated w i th specialized market suppl iers, even though 
they have new technology and l ow compet i t ion. Because 
specialized outside suppliers do not cause the corporat ion to 
incur high transaction costs , they are unlikely to be candidates 
for integration. This f inding suppor ts Coase (1988) in his as-
sertion that asset specif ic i ty is not a suff ic ient condit ion for 
vertical integration (cf. Klein, 1988, and Wi l l iamson, 1988). 
Relational contracting not only decreases the threat of vertical 
integration, but it also reduces the threat that outside sup-
pliers wil l be terminated. Decentral izat ion has the opposi te 
effect on in-house uni ts : it increases the threat of termina-
t ion. The net outcome is that market compet i t ion leads t o 
greater cooperation in-house, contrary to H3. Thus in-house 
suppliers are apparently not p ro tec ted by an internal procure-
ment bias. Since market incent ives are viable w i th in the cor-
poration for standard inputs, the costs of managing t h e m are 
likely to be low and may approach the costs of managing 
standard inputs w i th n e w techno logy in the market under re-
lational contracting. This result chal lenges the assumpt ion in 
transaction-cost theory that the market manages all standard 
assets more eff iciently (e.g., Wi l l i amson, 1981 ; Masten, 
1984; Riordan and Wi l l i amson, 1985). 
Neither decentralization nor relational contract ing have a salu-
brious ef fect on the behavior of suppl iers that have made 
preselection investments in n e w technology. Unexpectedly, 
these investments do not involve specialized assets, sug-
gesting that these suppliers are unlikely to participate in buyer 
programs such as early sourc ing. Nor are the markets for 
these products highly compet i t i ve . Therefore, w i th in the cor-
poration, prof i t centers w i t h n e w technology investments are 
influenced neither by the coordinat ion mechanisms to 
manage specialized suppliers nor by the discipline of market 
compet i t ion. Outside the corporat ion, relational contract ing 
may break d o w n because of the need to cover the high f ixed 
costs of new investment in an emerg ing market. 
External validity. Our variables may have l imited external va-
lidity because they do not measure dollar prices or costs . This 
l imitation is characteristic of research on transaction-cost 
theory. The "microana ly t ic " focus that Wi l l iamson (1985: 403) 
advocated has led researchers to measure managerial exper i -
ence in a number of inst i tut ional contexts . Generalizing t h e 
constructs underlying these measures and the logic con-
necting the constructs is a pr imary research task to w h i c h the 
present study contr ibutes. 
Our measurement of t ransact ion costs i l luminates some 
problems in developing a single, generalizable construct. The 
covariation of measurement error be tween the t ransact ion-
cost indicators ( e 5 6 ) may represent their shared content : t h e 
diff iculty of agreeing on ad justment-cost allocation. In t u rn , 
the poor convergent validity of the measures may be due to 
unshared content : the d i f ferent causes of adjustment cos ts 
—eng ineer ing changes and material cost changes—tha t they 
capture. This result suggests that est imat ing the process of 
achieving agreement w i t h a suppl ier may be separated f r o m 
the substant ive issues about w h i c h agreement is reached. 
Measur ing more broadly def ined transaction costs is the re -
fore likely to be at least as comp lex as our problem here, 
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since they include both interunit conflict and governance 
costs. To reduce this complexity, future researchers may 
choose to decompose broad concepts into their unique con-
tents , e.g., product design changes, and predict each content 
w i t h a separate theory. This theory should be tailored to the 
practices and policies that can be tied to the specific content 
predicted. Since our predictions for engineering and material 
cost changes w e r e similar, w e infer that their institutional 
contexts we re comparable. 
Several dist inguishing characteristics of our sample and 
method deserve to be discussed. First, in contrast to previous 
transaction-cost studies, wh ich typically have analyzed conve-
nience samples, w e analyzed a random sample f rom the 
complete product list of the division. Thus w e can be reason-
ably conf ident that our results generalize to the population of 
assembly division inputs. Second, like Walker and Weber 
(1984), but unlike authors of other previous studies, w e si-
multaneously tes ted our hypotheses and est imated a mea-
surement model . W e thereby identified that part of the 
covariance among the variables due to measurement alone. 
Third, our knowledge of how our theory applies to the institu-
tional context in w h i c h it was tested not only increased the 
study 's internal validity but indicates the type of organization 
and supplier relationships to which our model and results 
apply. Because suppl ier reduction and "ou tsourc ing" pro-
grams have been adopted by many U.S. manufacturing firms, 
w e believe our mode l may have reasonably w ide applicability. 
Conclusion. Wh i le defending the core of transaction-cost 
theory, our f indings raise questions concerning how the 
theory should be applied to complex economic institutions 
facing strong compet i t ion in their product markets. Corporate 
decentralization and relational contracting diminish the role of 
asset specialization as a necessary condit ion for low transac-
t ion costs in-house and as a sufficient condit ion for high 
transaction costs in the market. Therefore, how the theory 
should be used as a predictor of shifts in the current bound-
aries of the corporat ion is unclear. 
W e suspect that the effect of in-house asset specialization on 
transaction costs ref lects both enduring supplier governance 
practices and n e w policies designed to improve supplier per-
formance. H o w and w h e n , in the history of an organization, 
supplier asset specialization determines the organization's 
boundaries thus becomes a critical quest ion. Careful research 
on the separate origins and consequences of in-house and 
market governance is therefore a necessary and central re-
search agenda for transaction-cost theory. 
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